Tax Reform in Slovakia by Radovan Chalupka
382 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 54, 2004, ã. 9-10
UDC: 336.22(437.6); 336.22.01
Keywords: tax reform – flat tax – Slovakia
Tax Reform in Slovakia
Radovan CHALUPKA*
1. Introduction
Having won the 2002 general elections, the new Slovak government ini-
tiated a number of reforms, including a radical reform of the tax system.
The goal of the tax reform was to eliminate the complications and ambigui-
ties of the current taxation system, and to “tax all kinds of profit and all
heights of profit equally and thus achieve the maximum possible equity”
(INEKO, 2004). The new legislation came into effect on the 1st of Janu-
ary 2004.
In this article we aim at evaluating the tax reform, as it was proposed by
the Ministry of Finance, applying the optimal taxation and optimal tax sys-
tems theory. We try to identify both strengths and weaknesses of the pro-
posal. In the second section we shortly summarise the concept of the Slo-
vak tax reform, in the third section we review the basic theory of optimal
taxation, and in the fourth section we analyse whether the proposed income
and commodity taxes are optimal. In the final section we conclude that
the new tax system in Slovakia is optimal.
2. The Concept of Tax Reform
Richard Sulík, the man behind the reform, maintains the new system is
built on the following principles:
– Equity. Horizontal equity – people with equal incomes are taxed equally.
Vertical equity – people with higher income pay relatively (in percentage
terms) higher tax. When the tax is linear, this can be achieved by perso-
nal allowance.
– Neutrality. Taxation should not distort economic processes and decisions
of economic agents.
– Simplicity. Rules must be simple, easy to understand and unambiguous,
and allow minimal administrative costs for each level of tax revenue.
– Effective. The system should not provide a possibility to avoid taxes whe-
ther legally or illegally. The higher the number of exemptions, the easier
the possibility of tax avoidance.
Apart from these principles, the reform also encompasses another theory:
– Direct taxation should aim at serving only fiscal purposes and should not
be used to meet other goals, such as social policy.
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– If taxes are perceived as unfair, people are more likely to avoid them.
– The tax reform should comply with EU legislation.
Incorporation of these principles led to the reformed tax system compo-
sed of linear personal and corporate income taxes, immovable property tax,
automobile tax (direct taxes), VAT and excises (indirect taxes).
Linear income tax. The incomes of all subjects (physical and legal enti-
ties, domestic and foreigners) are taxed by a single rate of 19 %. The diffe-
rence is only in the way the tax base is calculated (for instance, an emplo-
yee can reduce his/her tax base by insurance contributions paid and personal
allowances).
Value added tax is set at 19 %. Exemptions to this rate should be allowed
only if EU guidelines command. Thethreshold for VAT registration has been
reduced from SK 3 million annual revenues to SK 1.5 million.
Excise Taxes. Thereform increases almost every kind of excise tax. Thetwo
objectives are compliance with EU guidelines and compensation of possibly
reduced tax revenues due to lower income tax rates.
Abolished taxes. Donation and inheritance taxes were abolished, because
they were perceived as a double taxation of assets, which have been previ-
ously taxed.
3. The Theory of Optimal Taxation
How do we know if one tax system is better than an another? The litera-
ture (Heady, 1993) seems to agree on three criteria of optimal taxes:
(1) taxes must be fair;
(2) tax administrative costs must be minimised;
(3) the disincentive effects of taxes must be minimised.
These separate criteria can be treated together within a concept of social
welfare function, which, summarizing utilities of individuals into the uti-
lity of the whole society, is able to reflect social preferences, namely concern
for equity.
The social welfare function may take the following form:
1
Social welfare = –––––   (uh)1–  for     1
1 –      h
Social welfare =  log (uh) for   = 1
h
Where uh is the utility of an individual (or household) h, positively de-
pendant on her income and negatively on her labour supplied, and   is
the degree of concern for equity. If    = 0, the society is not concerned about
inequality, whereas, if   is positive, increases in individual uh are trans-
1
formed into less than proportional increases of aggregate –––––   (uh)1– ,
1 –     h
which implies that less weight is attached to a given absolute increase of
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with lower levels of utility.
All taxes affect the behaviour of subjects to some extent; in the case of
an employee, taxes affect how many hours they are willing to work, i.e. what
is their labour supply. The overall effect of tax change is decomposed into
an ‘income effect’ and ‘substitution effect’. The income effect is a synonym
for one’s willingness to work more in order to compensate for income lost due
to taxation. The substitution effect goes in different direction: as the higher
tax reduces the marginal return to work (each hour of work is less reward-
ing), a person is willing to work less (decrease their labour supply), because
working becomes less “profitable”. The composite effect of these two, which
is ambiguous, determines elasticity of thelabour supply1. If thelabour supply
is highly elastic, an increase in tax leads to a considerable decline of hours
worked, while if it is inelastic (approaching zero), a tax increase would have
little effect on the number of hours worked.
4. The Income Tax
Income taxation embraces personal income tax (PIT) and corporate in-
come tax (CIT). Because the optimal tax theory covers specifically, the more
complex PIT, it will also be our focus. Then we will consider if the same tax
rate is appropriate for corporations.
Mirrlees (1971) analyses both non-linear taxation (the old tax system in
Slovakia) and linear taxation (the new system). The important factors in-
fluencing the net effect of a tax increase on social welfare in the case of non-
-linear taxation are:
1. compensated elasticity of labour supply (a high elasticity will mean that
the net revenue gain is either small or negative, so a tax increase is less
likely to increase social welfare);
2. degree of concern for inequality (the higher the concern for inequality,
the higher is the probability of increased social welfare);
3. degree of income inequality (the higher the inequality, the higher the pro-
bability of increased social welfare);
4. proportion of the population above the range of the tax increase (the high-
er the proportion, the higher the probability of increased social welfare).
The implication of the latter factor is that the marginal tax rate of a per-
son with the highest income should be zero, because raising it above zero
will not generate extra revenue. This argument can be extended to the fin-
ding that the marginal rate should be decreasing in contrast to the com-
mon practice of increasing marginal rates. The logic goes as follows: if
the marginal rate for a high earning person is increased, they will experi-
ence the above mentioned substitution effect (incentive to decrease their la-
bour supply) and income effect (incentive to increase their labour supply).
However, because the new rate applies only to a small proportion of their
income, the size of the reduction in their after-tax income is small, and
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1 i.e., percent change in labour supply given percent change in the tax ratethe substitution effect dominates – the person pays less taxes. Hence, no
matter how redistributive the government is (or pretends to be) the opti-
mal tax schedule for the highest earners (top of the income distribution)
should have a declining marginal rate.
Mirrlees also extended this theoretical result for the top of the income dis-
tribution to the complete optimal tax schedule. He found a very small de-
cline in the marginal rate over most of the income distribution; so small
that the optimal income tax schedule can be approximated by a constant
marginal rate, i.e. a linear income taxation. In this respect, the income tax
proposed in Slovakia is in line with theoretical recommendations.
Certain tax progression can be achieved by maintaining a fixed income
allowance (i.e. the amount of income that is not taxed; the Slovak reform
suggests SK 80,832 instead of the existing SK 38,760). Caminada and
Goudswaard (2001) showed in the example of the Netherlands that linear
tax combined with fixed income allowance maintains satisfactory level of
progression measured by the Gini coefficient. Again, the Slovak proposal is
in line with the theoretical literature (see also Figure 1).
Is a tax rate of 19 % correct? Stern (1976) included in his model concern
for equity, compensated the elasticity of labour supply and the size of the go-
vernment’s revenue requirement. His results showed that the optimal mar-
ginal rate of income tax is higher for:
– lower values of the compensated elasticity of labour supply,
– higher degree of concern for inequality,
– greater inequality in pre-tax wages,
– higher government revenue requirement.
The actual rates then range from 54–90 %, and include all tax burdens
(VAT, excises, compulsory insurance contribution – because of the weak link
between marginal contributions and the level of benefits). Atkinson (1995)
conducted analysis to find out the optimal linear tax. He used the same first
three parameters as Stern to derive the formula:
t 1         wLS                   ’(V)
––––– = –– E [
–––––––  1 – ––––– ] 1 – t        E(wLS)             
























































































































FIGURE 1 The Progression of Income Tax ’(V)
where t is the tax rate,   is the elasticity of labour supply, ––––– is the nor-
 
malised change in the social welfare function if the income of a social group
wLS
is increased (degree of concern for inequality) and –––––––– is income of
E (wLS)
a social group in comparison to the average income (inequality in pre-tax
wages). Using this equation we can derive the optimal income tax rate. For
example, in the case of the Rawlsian social welfare function (where all
the weight in the social welfare function is put on the poorest person) and
unitary elasticity of the labour supply, the optimal rate is 50 %.
As mentioned before Caminada and Goudswaard found that in the Ne-
therlands, a 27.7% linear rate would be fiscally neutral. It is difficult to
make any suggestions to Slovakia, but because the Slovak proposal aims
for overall fiscal neutrality (not just PIT) using also other higher taxes,
a rate lower than 27.7 % should be expected to be neutral.
Developing countries usually apply multiple rates of CIT, differentiated
along sectored lines. This is, however, detrimental to the proper functioning
of market forces and distorts the sectored allocation of resources (Tanzi,
2000). In the case of Slovakia, a single rate of 25 % already exists for cor-
porations. The problem of the old system was in the significant difference
between the CIT and top marginal rate of the PIT (38 %). The difference
distorted business decisions – doing business purely for avoiding high PIT.
Tanzi argues that equalising the CIT and the marginal PIT rate is a pre-
ferable way remove this distortion.
5. The Commodity Tax
The theory on optimal taxation quotes analysis by Ramsey (1927). Un-
der the assumption, that demand for particular goods is independent of
the price of other goods, he derived an ‘inverse elasticity rule’: goods with
higher price-inelastic demands should be taxed more heavily. The rule has
wide influence and its basic rationale – that the taxation of inelastic 
goods yields more revenue, because demand only falls slightly – is pro-
bably responsible for the taxation of alcohol, tobacco and petrol all over
the world.
Adifferent perspective was shown by Corlett and Hague (1953), who looked
on the situation where there are two consumption goods taxed at the same
rate and asked whether efficiency could be improved by introducing some
non-uniformity (raising the tax on one good and lowering the tax on the other).
They showed that, if the goods differed in their degrees of complementari-
ty’s or substitutability with leisure, efficiency could be improved by increas-
ing the tax rate on the goods that were most complementary (or least sub-
stitutable) with leisure and reducing the tax rate on the other goods. 
Heady (1987) showed, these two views are consistent (if demands are in-
dependent) because the goods which are most complementary to leisure will
also be the goods with the most inelastic demand curve (e.g. alcohol).
The Slovak tax reform (and also the old system) uses these principles in
the form of excise tax on alcohol, tobacco and petrol.
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reason for such high rates as they are used in most countries. The justifi-
cation must be found in terms of externalities that the consumption of these
goods imposes on other people or on basis of a paternalistic concern for
the consumer’s health. Taking into account these aspects high special ra-
tes on this kind of consumption is legitimate. The proposed increase in
the excises (generally above the directives of the EU) also seeks a revenue
purpose. The overall decrease in income tax may, especially in the short
run, lead to a budget shortfall, and an increase in excises is a remedy.
Turning away from “externality producing commodities”, the important
notion that has to be added to the inverse price elasticity rule (or leisure
complementarily) is the question of the income elasticity. While the former
deals with efficiency (the highest revenue to be collected), the latter hand-
les equity. Many goods with low price elasticity, also have low-income elas-
ticity (therefore, they are necessities), so raising the tax rate will hurt low-
-income individuals. Hence, goods requiring different tax treatment would
have to be divided into clusters by their income elasticity. Necessities would
be taxed lower than luxuries (goods with higher income elasticity). Indeed,
most OECD countries have at least two rates, the standard rate and the re-
duced rate.
Deaton and Stern (1986) showed that it is better to give households di-
rect payments, than to reduce tax on particular goods, because the reduc-
tion in the tax will benefit the rich more, as they buy higher quantity of
that good. (Ján Tóth noted: “State should not subsidise electrical heating of
swimming pools nor the price of bread for the rich citizens.” (Jaro‰, 2003)).
Cnossen (1998) adds that exemptions on social, health, education, social
and cultural services violate the neutrality criterion and should not be used.
However, he also argues that dual VAT is preferable for low-income count-
ries, which face major constraints in low administrative capacity to tax per-
sonal income and to operating income support programs. Low-income count-
ries often have dualistic economies with class-differentiated consumption
patterns that lend themselves more easily and effectively to the alleviation
of the regressive impact of consumption. On the other hand, in high-income
countries, reduced rates are not an effective way of alleviating the tax im-
pact on the poor. The consumption patterns of low and high-income groups
have converged, so that reduced rates benefit more the rich. Differentiated
VAT rate structures, moreover, greatly increase administrative and com-
pliance costs, particularly of small businesses.
6. Other Issues of the Tax Reform
One of the theories of the tax reform is that perception of tax fairness in-
fluence the extent of tax avoidance. This thesis can be viewed as the ex-
tension of Musgrave (1959) ‘spite effect’. As he proposes, imposing an un-
fair tax may call forth a feeling of anger, a desire to hit back and inflict
losses on the government. In the original argument people react by redu-
cing one’s work effort and hence one’s tax base. However, other different
ways of revenge are imaginable – evading taxes either by creative accoun-
ting, improper reporting of income or simply by not paying taxes. As the tax
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they are popular with the taxpayers. According to the recent polls, more
than three quarters of Slovaks thought the old tax system should be refor-
med. (Javorsk˘, 2003)
Slemrod and Sorum (1984) elaborate on administrative costs of tax sys-
tems, which may be quite high (e.g. 7 % of tax revenue in USA). The cur-
rent overgrown legislation is hard to process even for better motivated peo-
ple, than tax officers. Complicated legislation is also ambiguous and many
issues had to be resolved either at the discretion of tax officers or by
the courts. Also in this area, the reform may be a positive step forward: uni-
form income tax and a single VAT rate are consistent with the desire to de-
crease administrative complicatedness and hence to decrease administra-
tive costs.
Once Slovakia enters the European single market, the destination prin-
ciple (a good is taxed by the rate of consumer’s country which ensures that
producer competitiveness is not affected by thetax rate in her country) could
not be effectively used to prevent the distortion in the relative prices – be-
cause of removed boundary controls. Sinn (1990) points out that other pro-
posed methods of how to solve this problem (the invoice and the subscrip-
tion) will not do the job. He argues that tax harmonisation is the only way
to prevent efficiency loss resulting from distortion caused by different tax
rates in EU member countries. The Slovak reform sets a single rate that is
preferred to multiple, more difficult to harmonise VAT tax systems.
Similarly, the corporate income tax rate is important from the internatio-
nal perspective. Lower rates can attract more capital to Slovakia and in-
crease tax revenues. Although other countries (following prisoners’dilemma
scenario) will most likely also decrease their tax the rates in future, Slova-
kia may still take advantage of its leadership until they do so.
The important issue to consider is the effect of the reform on particular
social groups, tax incidence. The proposed PIT would not increase the tax
burden of any income class (see Figure 2). The low-income class (earning
annual income of 10,000 to 30,000 SK) and numerous middle-income class
(140,000 to 210,000 SK) would pay the same taxes, while the other groups
will pay lower taxes.
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FIGURE 2 Annual Reduction in the Tax BurdenWith a proposed single 19% VAT, it is obvious that while the tax reform
may be fiscally neutral (the average taxpayer will pay the same taxes),
the group effects may be different (some people will pay higher taxes). How-
ever, since the Gini coefficient measuring the inequality of income is inhe-
rently low (among OECD countries approaching themost equalitarian Scan-
dinavian states (Human Development Reports, 2003)), the change that may
generate greater inequality based on desert principle is justifiable.
7. Conclusion
We have examined the new Slovak reform of the tax system, using cur-
rent optimal taxation principles. After describing the basic theoretical prin-
ciples and findings, and comparing them to the new tax system, we have
concluded that a flat rate of income tax (both personal and corporate) is con-
sistent with optimal taxation. Abolishment of the reduced VAT rate is also
a positive step forward. Both these changes also alleviate administrative
costs and should reduce tax evasions (especially in VAT). Finally, the new
tax system is also Pareto optimal.
REFERENCES
ATKINSON, A. B. (1995). Public Economics in Action. The Basic Income/Flat Tax Proposal.
The Lindahl Lectures. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995.
CAMINADA, K. – GOUDSWAARD, K. (2001): Does a Flat Rate Individual Income Tax Reduce
Tax Progressivity? A Simulation for the Netherlands. Leiden University, 2001.
CNOSSEN, S. (1998): Global Trends and Issues in Value Added Taxation. International Tax and
Public Finance, vol. 5, 1998, no. 3, pp. 399–428.
CORLETT, W. J. – HAGUE, D. C. (1953): Complementarity and the Excess Burden of Taxation.
Review of Economic Studies, vol. 21, 1953, pp. 21–30.
DEATON, A. S. – STERN, N. H. (1986): Optimally Uniform Commodity Taxes, Taste Differences
and Lump-Sum Grants. Economics Letters, 1986, vol. 20, pp. 263–6.
HEADY, C. (1987): A Diagmatic Approach to Optimal Commodity Taxation. Public Finance,
vol. 42, 1987, pp. 250–63.
HEADY, C. (1993): Optimal Taxation as a Guide to Tax Policy: A Survey. Fiscal Studies, vol. 14,
1993, no. 1, pp. 15–41.
Human Developments Reports (2003): Human Developments Indicators 2003.
http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/indicator/indic_126_2_2.html [downloaded: January 31, 2004]
INEKO (Stredoeurópsky in‰titút pre ekonomické a sociálne reformy) (2004): DaÀová reforma.
http://www.ineko.sk/reformy2003/dane.htm [cit.: 31. 1. 2004]
JARO·, M. (2003): Strednej vrstve sa uºaví zrejme aÏ neskôr. Pravda, roã. 74, marec 2003, s. 13.
JAVORSK¯, J. (2003): ªudia si daÀovú reformu p˘tajú. SME, 11. marca 2003.
MIRRLEES, J. A. (1971): An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation. Review
of Economic Studies, vol. 38, 1971, pp. 175–208.
MUSGRAVE, R. A. (1959): The Theory of Public Finance. New York, McGraw Hill, 1959.
RAMSEY, F. P. (1927): A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation. Economic Journal, vol. 37,
1927, pp. 47–61.
SINN, H. W. (1990): Tax Harmonisation and Tax Competition in Europe. European Economic
Review, vol. 34, 1990, pp. 489–504.
SLEMROD, J. – SORUM, N. (1984): The Compliance Cost of the U.S. Individual Income Tax
System. National Tax Journal, vol. 37, December 1984, pp. 461–74.
389 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 54, 2004, ã. 9-10SLEMROD, J. (1990): Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems. Journal of Economic Per-
spectives, vol. 4, no. 1, winter 1990, pp. 157–178.
STERN, N. H. (1976): On the Specification of Models of Optimum Income Taxation. Journal of
Public Economics, vol. 6, 1976, pp. 123–62.
TANZI, V. – ZEE, H. H. (2000): Tax Policy for Emerging Markets: Developing Countries. Inter-
national Monetary Fund, Working Paper, 2000, no. 35.
SUMMARY
JEL classification: H2
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Tax Reform in Slovakia
Radovan CHALUPKA –Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague
(pinco@myself.com)
The paper evaluates recent tax legislation in Slovakia, effected January 2004,
according to principles of optimal taxation and optimal tax systems. The author eva-
luates Slovak tax reform with particular regard to personal income tax and com-
modity taxes. The adoption of a flat personal-income-tax rate and a uniform VAT
rate is viewed as in line with the optimal taxation theory, and the projected lessen-
ing of administrative costs and degree of tax evasion is positively evaluated.
390 Finance a úvûr – Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 54, 2004, ã. 9-10